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Lawlessness Revealed: The Supreme Court's Man of
Liberty Transcends Tort Law
Nelson P. Miller
With what Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist
would later label his "customary clarity," Justice Potter Stewart in
a concurrence in the 1966 defamation case Rosenblatt v. Baer put
the basis for tort law right where it has always been: The right of a
man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept
of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'
As Justice Stewart put it, the "concept" which is both "basic"
to and "the root of' tort law's ordered liberty is none other than
"the essential" "worth" of being. Tort laws are rooted in the
intrinsic value of universal and individual being. Tort law is above
all the great law of care-not care for efficiency, not care for
liberty, not care for self-expression (though those attributes are
certainly of value to the extent that they promote that which tort
law also promotes)-but care for human life itself.
Tort law's duty of care is fully justified by the extent to which
it promotes good to being because being has an essential worth
beyond the measure of anything else of value. How must the law
constrain us to think of one another's value? What is your measure
of worth, and how must the law regard it? History judges the laws
of nations on how they value life. The laws of Stalin's Soviet
Union or Amin's Uganda seem not to have valued life at all,
whereas the laws of Hitler's Germany regarded the lives of some
as supremely valuable but the lives of others without any value-
the laws of those nations properly being judged by history as
abhorrent. The value of being is as undeniable to law as it is to
medicine, art, literature, philosophy, and all other legitimate
pursuits and professions. Good to being is at the root of tort law as
surely as it is in any other field. As Justice Stewart's words above
suggested, the charity, the benevolence, or, more prosaically the
valuing of the good of being which define care, is the ends on
which tort law depends for its justification.
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1. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92, 86 S. Ct. 669, 679 (1966) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
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Unfortunately, Justice Stewart has not had the Supreme Court's
last word on tort law. The Supreme Court has, in two more recent
tort cases since Rosenblatt v. Baer, rejected care for one another as
the foundation of tort law and the intrinsic good. In care's place,
the Supreme Court has made liberty the intrinsic good. The first
such case, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union in 1984, protected false
commercial expression with the Court saying that "the freedom to
speak one's mind is... a good unto itself.... ,2 The second such
case, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell in 1988, protected intentionally
severely distressing pornographic depiction, quoting Bose Corp.
and repeating that "the freedom to speak one's mind is... a good
unto itself. ,3
The Supreme Court thus conceives of expression-not merely
the false commercial expression in Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union
but also the intentionally severely distressing pornographic
expression in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell-as the ultimate
(intrinsic rather than instrumental or conditional) good. This
exaltation of the self over duties to one another echoed again even
more recently in Lawrence v. Texas's "transcendent" "autonomy. 'A
Increasingly to the Court, self-expression is the intrinsic good and
personal liberty the fundamental value, displacing the care tort law
would ordinarily require of us for one another. The ihostly
presence of the expressive self, as one writer has called it, more
and more haunts the corridors of justice.
Of course such claims of an unconstrained and self-defining
man, governed by "do for your self' rather than by "do unto others
as for yourself," are hardly new. After all, destructive self-
definition ("I will be like God") in violation of a simple command
given by the supremely beneficent authority was man's first
independent act. We are forever challenged by and enamored of
liberty. Even within the law, liberty is at once both the caged and
singing bird--caged because without restraint liberty might pluck
the eyes from any one of us, but singing because of the role self-
2. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-
04, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (1984).
3. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51, 108 S. Ct. 876, 879
(1988) (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503-04, 104 S. Ct. at 1961).
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
5. Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 443, 444 (1998). Murchison says to "[c]all the ghost the
'self-realization value' of the First Amendment." Id. (citing Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877,
879 (1963)). See also Zechariah Chaffee Jr., Free Speech in the United States
33 (Antheum 1969) (1941).
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determination plays in our ends and purposes. An unfettered
liberty would be just as much the justifier of the grotesquely arch
villain Jeffrey Dahmer as of the saint Mother Teresa. But the will
to choose one path or the other seems a necessary ingredient in
determining the obvious value (one good, one bad) of either.
Indeed, in few cases did the liberty animal show both its sides
so clearly than in the Supreme Court's Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell case. Though not the cannibal murderer Dahmer, the
defendant Hustler pornographic magazine publisher Flynt
fabricated as purposeful, disgusting, and injuring an attack on
reputation as human imagination could muster. Though not
Mother Teresa, the plaintiff school founder Falwell was yet
remarkably accomplished. He was certainly without the passing
reproach of figures like Bakker and Swaggart with whom some
might have mistakenly associated him. We had in other words a
remarkably light and an equally remarkably dark knight, both of
whom had chosen to exercise their quite different liberties in the
manner their wills (or perhaps in Flynt's case a part of the anatomy
somewhat lower) compelled them.
Among the many law commentators who have treated the
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell case, it is not surprising to find
opposing camps, one generally approvinj of the Supreme Court's
decision and one generally disapproving. There are arguments to
be made for either. What is more interesting for our purposes,
6. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1190 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("Hustler Magazine is a pornographic periodical. Much of its content
consists of what we have recently described as 'disgusting and distasteful
abuse."' (citing Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir.
1988))).
7. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Jerry Falwell v. Larry Flynt: The First
Amendment on Trial (1988); Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by
Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and the Refortification of Defamation Law's
Constitutional Aspects, 26 Am. Bus. L.J.665 (1989); James R. Laguzza, Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell: Laugh or Cry, Public Figures Must Learn to Live
with Satirical Criticism, 16 Pepp. L.Rev. 97 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Diane L. Borden, Invisible Plaintiffs: A Feminist Critique on
the Rights of Private Individuals in the Wake of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 35
Gonzaga L.Rev. 291 (1999-2000); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 601 (1990); Bruce Fein, Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell: A Mislitigated and Misreasoned Case, 30 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 905 (1989) (reviewing Rodney A. Smolla, Jerry Falwell v. Larry Flynt:
The First Amendment on Trial (1988)); R. George Wright, Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell and the Role of the First Amendment, 19 Cumb. L.Rev. 19 (1988-1989).
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though, is how the case reveals the underlying values and
suppositions. The purpose of this writing is not to add another
voice to either side along the traditional lines of the legal and
cultural debates, so much as it is to examine a key assumption
made by the Supreme Court and see how that assumption might
have affected or yet affect other tort cases. To be more frank, the
purpose here is to point out a fundamental fallacy in the Court's
opinion which (together with its corollary) tends to plague law
generally and tort law more particularly-a fallacy which the
Court just recently amplified and extended in Lawrence.
The fallacy which the Court accepted in Bose Corp. and
Falwell and extended in Lawrence is that liberty is a "good unto
itself." Part I of this article explores what the Court and
commentators have likely meant when describing liberty as an
intrinsic good. In truth though, liberty is not a good unto itself but
rather an instrumental or conditional good. Liberty is as much an
attribute of murder, mayhem, and other vices as it is of the virtues
of care and their corollaries. Thus Part II of this article argues that
the law must clearly regard liberty as an instrumental or
conditional good. In this view this writer is not alone. Indeed
commentator Robert Post attributes the current disarray in the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence to precisely that error.9
This article is however not primarily regarding First Amendment
issues. It is instead written by a tort law commentator, professor,
and practitioner. Thus Part III describes a corollary error that
liberties are (and ought to be) balanced against and overriding of
the care required of us by tort law. It is not merely that the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence is in disarray because of the
Court's having mistakenly granted liberty an intrinsic value. Tort
law, too, is much affected by the same misconception. Finally,
Part IV suggests that the law should regard liberty not as opposed
to and having to be balanced with care but rather as found in care
as liberty's author and definer. This latter premise-still not
original in the broader field but yet surprisingly absent from or
suppressed within the law-is the contribution offered by this
writer.
I. LIBERTY AN INTRINSIC GOOD
The above introduction is not an exaggeration or misreading of
Bose Corp. and Falwell-nor could it be insofar as it relies solely




on Bose Corp.'s and Falwell's single quote that "the freedom to
speak one's mind" is a "good unto itself.' 0 The Supreme Court
quite plainly declared speaking one's mind to be an intrinsic good.
It takes no parsing of the Court's opinion to reach that conclusion,
for the Court said it itself. One might think the Court's choice of
words "speaking one's mind" (rather than "speech" or "self
expression") to be a bit curious. This writer is not a lexicographer,
but "speaking one's mind" does carry with it a schoolmarm-like
flavor as if one is about to receive a "good tongue-lashing." And
perhaps such a lexicographic limitation would make more
palatable the Court's equating the liberty to speak one's mind with
an intrinsic good. Rebuke from a sound authority figure is indeed
much to be cherished.
But the Falwell case itself permits no such limitation. Flynt at
least is no schoolmarm. Apparently when the Court equated
speaking one's mind with an intrinsic good, it meant to include
speaking a filthy and vindictive mind as much as any other, for that
was clearly Falwell's context. Flynt had testified on deposition
that his purpose in publishing that Falwell had several times had
sexual intercourse with his mother in an outhouse was to
"assassinate" Falwell-to destroy and silence him." It would be
unfair to infer that any members of the Supreme Court personally
approved of Flynt's sophomoric linguistic style and incredibly base
proclivities-which only makes the Court's equating of speaking
such a mind with intrinsic goodness all the more pronounced and
surprising.
The extent to which the Court's statement that speaking one's
mind is an intrinsic good actually affected the outcome of the
Falwell case is probably a good question. The statement may not
have been necessary at all. Some have argued that Falwell's
outcome was perfectly in line with developing Court free speech
doctrine' -which again only makes the Court's equating of a
vindictive liberty (a liberty intentionally exercised to destroy
another) with intrinsic goodness all the more pronounced and
surprising. Nor does it change the analysis that the Court was
quoting another of its defamation cases Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union when it wrote in Falwell that speaking one's mind was good
10. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-
04, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (1984); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-
51, 108 S. Ct. 876, 879 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503-04, 104 S.
Ct. at 1961).
11. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.,
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
12. See sources cited supra note 8.
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in itself. Although starkly different factually, both Falwell and
Bose Corp. were yet both tort cases including defamation counts in
which the plaintiffs were claiming injuries to reputation.
One might think that too much has now been made of the
Court's perhaps offhand statement in Falwell-that the quote has
been taken out of context or to the extreme (though the facts of
Falwell would seem to have placed the case at the extreme
already). Yet such is not the case. We have already seen in the
last chapter that the Supreme Court extended its liberty-as-
intrinsic-good language to its "transcendent dimension" more
recently in Lawrence. And self-realization as a transcendent value
certainly did not start in the Court's jurisprudence with Falwell nor
even with Bose Corp. It has an interesting history with the Court.
As commentator Nicole Casarez wrote recently, "This 'freedom to
speak one's mind' has always been a cherished aspect of American
liberty, as reflected in the established First Amendment value of
individual self-actualization. ' 3  Liberty as its own end had a
footing with the Court already in 1927 when Justice Brandeis in
Whitney v. California labeled liberty to be "both... an end and...
a means. 14 That is what Justice Brandeis said: liberty as an end,
though when he later added that liberty's end was "to make men
free to develop their faculties" in particular for the "discovery and
spread of political truth"'15 it sounded much more like liberty as a
means.
The self-realization value later got a boost from an unusual
source. As a lawyer, Thurgood Marshall used evidence of
segregation's devastating effect on black children to convince the
Supreme Court in the 1954 case Brown v. Board of Education to
end legal segregation of the races.' 6 The Court accepted attorney
Marshall's argument that there is an independent value to self-
identification. Twenty years later, then-Justice Marshall amplified
13. Nicole B. Cisarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews
and the Jury System, 25 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 499, 579 (2003) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
559, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (1985)); Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 503-04, 104 S. Ct.
at 1961; Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment
3-7 (1966) (free speech serves individual self-fulfillment).
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence... valued liberty
both as an end and as a means.").
15. Id.
16. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). See Murchison, supra note 5, at




that same self-realization theme in the 1974 case Procunier v.
Martinez, in which he raised self-expression first to a "need" and
then to a "demand" and "basic yearning[]" of the "human spirit."'' 7
Procunier involved prisoner's First Amendment claims to receive
mail and have contact with law students and legal assistants. One
might rather readily have seen from Procunier's context that self-
expression and self-fulfillment are not so fragile but rather
extraordinarily resilient, for they clearly go on even after an
extraordinarily confining jailing. As Justice Marshall put it (citing
0. Henry and others writing from the jail cell), "When the prison
gates slam behind an inmate," that inmate's "quest for self-
realization" has not "concluded."'18 But the frankly inescapable
nature of self-expression was certainly not the intended point of
Procunier. It was instead a decision intended to advance and
protect self-expression.
That same year, 1974, the Court decided Spence v.
Washington, in which it held that the First Amendment would be
considered whenever "an intent to convey a particularized message
was present[] and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."' 19 Spence v. Washington in essence placed the value of
speech in the speech itself rather than its context.20 The Spence
test was so broad that commentator Robert Post would marvel at
how "transparently and manifestly false" it was, in light of other
Supreme Court cases rejecting that nearly anything communicative
can be labeled protected speech.21 But the Spence test survived
and prospered. Self-realization got yet another boost in 1996 when
the Court wrote in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
17. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427-28, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1818
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment serves not only the
needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-
expression.").
18. Id.
19. 418 U.S. 405,410-11, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2730 (1974).
20. Post, supra note 9, at 1273-74.
21. Id. at 1252 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993)); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S.
Ct. 3244, 3255 (1984) ("violence or other types of potentially expressive
activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact
• . . are entitled to no constitutional protection."); NAACP v. Claibome
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916, 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3427 (1982) ("The First
Amendment does not protect violence."); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1678 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85
S. Ct. 453, 464-65 (1965).
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Bisexual Group that "the fundamental rule of protection under the
First Amendment" is "that a speaker has the autonomy to choose
the content of his own message."2 2  The shift from democratic
truth-seeking toward autonomous self-definition was on.
It is by now readily apparent from the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence that the Court accepts not only the
traditional political self-governance, but also the marketplace of
ideas justification for expression.23 To the Court, speech is not just
to promote democracy. Members of the Court clearly also accept
an inherent value in liberty as a second and separate justification
for expression. Indeed when Justice Marshall in Procunier
accepted the "demand" and "basic yearning[]" of the "human
spint''24 as a justification for self-expression, he rather neatly
fulfilled the ancient prophecy that man in his lawless liberty
(lawlessness revealed) would soon set himself in the temple of
God. One does not have to be a priest or a shaman to see and write
of spirits in the law. Supreme Court justices exercise the same
prerogative. Justice Marshall made the human spirit's demands the
arbiter of what is appropriate in terms of expression,
notwithstanding what the supreme Spirit might have to say about
it, that we ought, even in our speaking, to be giving due regard for
the welfare of others.
Many law commentators such as Bradley Wendel have
followed the Court's lead (or have been leading the Court) by
calling "expressive freedom... valuable as an end in itself.",25 To
Wendel, "Speech as speech is so inextricably bound up with
individual autonomy and dignity that its suppression, especially by
the government, represents a rejection of the humanity of the
22. 515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2347 (1996).
23. Keith C. Buell, "Start Spreading the News:" Why Republishing
Material from "Disreputable" News Reports Must Be Constitutionally
Protected, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 966, 974 (2000) ("There are two primary
theoretical justifications underlying free-speech jurisprudence: a liberty interest
and a political interest in truth and self-governance.") (citing Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 1797 (1977))).
24. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427-28, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1818
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
25. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q.
305, 422 (2001) (citing Murchison, supra note 5); Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982); David A. Richards, Free Speech
and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 45, 62 (1974); Thomas M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 213-24 (1972) (the inherent value of
individual autonomy, not self-expression).
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speaker." 26  Wendel notes Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union as
having "hinted at this rationale" and the 1980 Supreme Court case
Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission as having
made an "ironic appeal" to it. But Wendel does not believe that
the Court has ever "accepted it as the primary basis for the
guarantee of free expression." 27 He makes no mention of Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell nor (because he wrote before the decision) of
Lawrence, both of which (in different contexts) appear to have
done just that: relied on expression's purported "transcendence"
and intrinsic goodness as a principal basis for overturning state
laws.
Law commentators who promote self-fulfillment have behind
them a substantial and growing literature on the self, outside of the
law, much of it purporting to be psychoanalytic, philosophical,
post-modem, or Nietzschean. 28 This writer does not pretend to
understand the meaning or significance of all or even much of this
writing concerning the self. For this writer, meaning evaporates
when a law commentator such as Brian Murchison writes that
"[liaw's interest appears to be the individual's process of self-
forgetting in the undertaking of action" and similar statements.
29
Some of the legal literature of the self is less complex. One law
commentator, Thomas Emerson, held forth, in keeping with this
literature of the self, that the end of law was to aid man in realizing
his own character and potentialities. 30 Some two decades later, law
commentator Martin Redish hit upon "individual self-realization"
as "the one true value" of the First Amendment. 31 To Redish, self-
realization is not the pursuit of truth for self-governance in a
democracy, but rather, is made up of the underlying values of
26. Wendel, supra note 25, at 422 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime,
and the Uses of Language 33 (1989)).
27. Id. at 422 & n.590 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (1984), and Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commn., 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2, 100 S.Ct. 2326,
2331 n.2 (1980)).
28. Murchison, supra note 5, at 443 n.6 (citing Robert Jay Lifton, The
Protean Self 28 (1993)); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 27-
34 (1989); David Tracy, The Hidden God: The Divine Other of Liberation, 46
Cross Currents 1, 5 (1996); David S. Caudill, Post-Postmodern Redemptions of
Self Text, and Event, 5 Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit. 143-5 8 (1993) (book review).
29. Murchison, supra note 5, at 461.
30. Emerson, supra note 5, at 879.
31. Redish, supra note 25, at 593 ("Free speech ultimately serves only one
true value, which I have labeled 'individual self-realization.'").
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individual self-determination and self-development. 32 Of course
self-determination implies a right of (or interest in) not being
guided or constrained by others. There indeed is the rub. Some
such as Frederick Schauer were thus not coy in admitting that the
self-realization value supporting free speech means a speech
unfettered by others.33 The view that autonomy is the fundamental
organizing principle is of course at the root of liberalism-that
from which liberalism draws its very name. The transcendent
value of autonomy is indeed the agnostic viewpoint used to justify
liberty, including ironically not only the freedom of speech but
even the freedom of religion. As we shall now see, though, the
autonomy argument-man as God in the temple-argues too
much, indeed so much as to be logically meaningless.
II. LAWLESSNESS REVEALED
To anyone with a passing recollection of philosophy (no more
than that which this author can claim), the Supreme Court's
reference in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell to an intrinsic good
might recall to mind Plato for whom justice was (as it indeed
remains) an intrinsic good. Justice requires no conditions or
results for its justification.34 Justice was the justifier, just as the
Court attempts to make liberty the justifier of our generation. But
to appreciate the conceptual (not to mention real and personal-
ask Reverend Falwell) difficulties the Court's declaration presents,
it ought to be remembered what is meant by something "good unto
itself:" something which is good without qualification or
limitation. Attributes which are good only when qualified or in
certain circumstances are not intrinsic goods. It is only that which
is good without condition or as an instrument to another end, that
is properly regarded as being good unto itself.
32. Id. at 602-04. See also Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy,
and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
678, 680 (1982).
33. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 6, 55, 56
(1982).
34. See Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric:
Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
813, 834 (2003). Professor Scallen reminds us that though a wealthy aristocrat
by birth, Plato, in the Apology, the Gorgias, the Phaedrus, and the Republic,
painted a dim view of the manipulative legal system which preserved his
family's noble status, and instead drew his inspiration from the "good unto




Indeed as has been shown above, virtue and vice share many
common attributes, liberty being only one of them. Both virtue
and vice include liberty, intelligence, and efficiency-liberty in the
ability to choose this or that conduct, intelligence in the sense of
the knowledge of the character of the choice, and efficiency in the
sense of the bringing about of the chosen end. Were not most of
our famously depraved just so because they possessed the liberty to
act (without which their notoriety would never have accrued), the
intelligence to understand the depravity of their act (without which
they would not have been properly regarded as depraved), and the
efficiency of having accomplished that which they sought? It is
not necessary to invoke demons to understand the point. Even so
favored an attribute, in our process-oriented law, as that of
deliberation is not a good unto itself but merely an occasional ally
(and an occasional foe) to virtue. It all depends on the purpose of
the deliberation. The instrumental or conditional goodness of
liberty seems so apparent.
The instrumental nature of liberty is no less true when the
liberty exercised is that of speaking-of self-expression.
Commentator Post for instance calls "doomed from the start" the
Court's attempt to protect speech as such because "'speech, as
such' has no constitutional value . . . . 35 Post concludes that
"value inheres instead in specific forms of social order" just as,
indeed, "speech has tended to receive the constitutional protection
necessary for it to facilitate the maintenance and success of
specific forms of social order." 36 Similarly, Robert George has
argued that the value of expression is solely instrumental: "Speech
that fails to advance any human good is valueless, for the value of
speech is instrumental, not intrinsic . . .,37
George's claim that speech's value is solely instrumental is
perhaps too broad. There may indeed be a sliver of expression that
has inherent value without regard to its content-perhaps a baby's
or deaf-mute's first struggling word in which some end of life is in
itself accomplished, though by constraining the context we are
probably proving the instrumental nature of even these forms of
expression. What about a never-before heard aria of excruciating
poignancy? Well again, it depends on the context. If it were sung
by the leader of the world's most powerful nation in sole response
to a genocidal regime's murder of hundreds of thousands of
innocents, that aria could as well be called an abomination. It
35. Post, supra note 9, at 1279.
36. Id.
37. Robert P. George, Making Men Moral 195 (1993); see also Stanley
Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech (1994).
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would be military commands, not arias, the situation would
require. There is clearly an "art" or aesthetic implied in the
judgment that self-expression has value, which again makes such
expression instrumental rather than inherently valuable. When one
encounters a man dying of starvation, the appropriate response is
to feed him, not to paint a picture of his hunger. Painting a picture
of hunger may by its consciousness-raising and publicity also help
the hungry man and others similarly situated, but that helpfulness
very much depends upon the skill and contacts of the painter-
which again, makes the painting instrumental rather than intrinsic.
Try as one might, it is awfully difficult to prove intrinsic the
goodness of self-expression.
Not that the Supreme Court entirely disagrees. The Court itself
has long understood and repeatedly held that speech's content is in
the right circumstances an appropriate subject for regulation. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court held that states could
regulate fighting words that by their utterance inflict injury or
incite immediate breaches of the peace. 38  In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, the Court recognized that vulgar, offensive, and
shocking speech is not entitled to absolute constitutional
protection.3  In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., the Court held that speech defamatory of private individuals
on private matters was not worthy of constitutional protection.
40
Indeed Justice Holmes himself, whose famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States had much to do with getting the First Amendment
free speech ball rolling, expressly grounded his reasoning not in
any inherent value to speech but in its instrumental capacity (that
which he characterized as "free trade of ideas") to achieve "the
ultimate good desired... .41 Now there seems a good pointing in
the right direction.
Re-labeling freedom and liberty as "self-realization ' ' 2 or "self-
fulfillment ' '43 does not make a justification which is otherwise
lacking. Post considers, but rejects, that those differently-styled
self functions might be First Amendment "universals."" As Post
argues, realization and fulfillment are essentially social practices
which, like any other social practices, have their "appropriate time
38. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769 (1942).
39. 438 U.S. 726, 747, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3039 (1978).
40. 472 U.S. 749, 758, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2944 (1985).
41. 250 U.S. 616, 630,40 S. Ct. 17, 22 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. See Redish, supra note 25, at 593.
43. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-7 (1970).
44. Post, supra note 9, at 1272-73.
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and place. '45  The doctor who for self-realization diverts from
accepted medical practice injuring the patient is certainly not
deserving of legal protection. Nor is the lawyer who uses the
courtroom for self-development 47 or the employee who uses the
workplace for self-fulfillment. 48 Indeed, have an employer tape
Flynt's pornographic parody of Reverend Falwell to an employee's
locker, and the law may recognize a good case of sexual
harassment. Self-fulfillment and self-realization are much the
same as freedom and liberty. It is sophism to glorify self-
expression as if it were an attribute or principle apart from, and
deeper than, freedom or liberty. Anything can be called self-
expressive. It may be little more than arrogance or convention to
call "art" expression but skilled labor in the home kitchen
something less than expression. Both are highly personal
statements of value--choices, as it were, of what the actor believes
to be of value. In a very real sense, self-expression is not a gift to
the bourgeoisie but a necessity for all of us at every moment.
The question of the nature of liberty turns one to asking, "What
are freedoms for?" That very phrase is the title of James Garvey's
1996 book exploring the subject.49 Garvey likewise concludes that
the value of liberty inevitably depends on whether it is exercised
for reasonably good and valuable ends.50  "There is no general
right to freedom; there are only particular freedoms," he writes in
reference to speech, press, religion, and assembly, and the
Supreme Court-granted freedoms of association and
reproduction. 51 Even within those freedoms, such as the freedom
of speech, the law exempts from protection whole categories such
as malicious defamation, bribes, obscenity, and so forth.52 Garvey
in essence inverted the first principle of liberalism "that the right is
prior to the good" so as to "begin with an idea about what is good
45. Id. at 1273.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and
Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169, 193-06).
48. Post, supra note 9, at 1273 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147,
103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983)).
49. James H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms For? (1996); see also Michael
Foster, What Are Freedoms For?, 48 Fed. Law. 85 (2001) (book review).
50. Garvey, supra note 49, at 19 ("[F]reedoms allow us to engage in certain
kinds of actions that are particularly valuable.").
51. Id. at 12-13, 17 ("[T]here is no universal right to freedom.").
52. Id. (citing Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A
Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1981), and William M. Van Alstyne,
A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 Cal. L.Rev. 107 (1982)).
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to do, and then assign rights so as to allow people to do what is
good. 53  In so concluding, Garvey properly writes that the
autonomy argument which liberalism uses to justify freedoms
(including ironically the freedom of religion) argues too much.54
Perhaps though, Garvey did not get it all right. Garvey did not
take Hustler Magazine v. Falwell as the source of his inquiry,
though like Falwell Garvey conceived of speech as intrinsically
good-so long at least as it promotes knowledge.55 To Garvey,
"the pursuit of knowledge" "is intrinsically good." Garvey holds
that the activity of pursuing knowledge "is worth doing for its own
sake.",56 Immediately, though, one must ask, knowledge of what?
Knowledge of evil-how to hire a hit man, how to destroy a
marriage or abuse a child-is hardly something to be desired. The
very baseness of these activities proves it problematic at best to
distinguish the pursuit of such knowledge from the possession of
the knowledge itself, or from acting upon that knowledge. The
concern grows exponentially when one considers that rational
minds possessed of knowledge are not necessarily attracted to
good and truth. Garvey himself gives the frightening example of
the extraordinary success of Nazi propaganda among an educated
and assumedly highly rational people.57  To justify liberty
generally or the freedom of speech in particular on the basis of the
pursuit of knowledge (itself proof that liberty is not an intrinsic
good if it requires a conditional justifier) only compounds the
problems.
There are probably few better examples, though, of the
instrumental good that self-expression represents than the Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell case itself. After all, the liberty depicted in
Falwell was drunken incest in a latrine. As the jury found, the
liberty exercised in Falwell was the intentional infliction of severe
distress. The Supreme Court's labeling such expression exercised
for such a purpose a "good unto itself' is absurd and
incongruous-an error by the Court of the first order. It is an
impossible stretch for the Court to have used the conventional
"marketplace of ideas" justification to protect Flynt's speech,
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 43-45.
55. See Foster, supra note 49, at 86 ("Speech enjoys special protection in
our Constitution, Garvey asserts, for the same reason that the other basic
freedoms do--it is intrinsically good because it promotes the pursuit of
knowledge."); see also Garvey, supra note 49, at 58 ("[W]e protect freedom of
speech... [because] freedom of speech lets us pursue knowledge.").
56. Garvey, supra note 49, at 67.
57. Id. at 66.
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because what Falwell proved Flynt had done was to purposely (and
to some extent, given Falwell's proof of severe distress,
successfully) attempt to remove Falwell from the market. Flynt
had made it no longer a marketplace of ideas but a figurative
bludgeoning of a competing ware-seller. Every market needs some
regulation to ensure sellers of the ability to at least offer their
wares. What Falwell proved was Flynt's purposeful effort to
remove another seller rather than to out-compete the sold product.
That is not to say necessarily that Falwell was wrongly
decided. The good news of Falwell is that the Court recognized
that there is such a thing as an intrinsic good, even if it placed that
intrinsic goodness in a most problematic of places-liberty. The
philosophical divide that law and society face more acutely now
than ever is well known: that to some everything is material and
relative and there is no such thing as an ideal or absolute standard,
whereas to others, such standards are more real than imagined and
their rejection the cause of an alarmingly dysfunctional society.
What the Supreme Court seemed to have tried in its liberty-as-the-
intrinsic good quip was to attempt to marry that relativistic, self-
actualizing worldlier to the Judeo-Christian/Platonic objective
truth-an uneasy union at best. The Court could have chosen
truth, justice, love, care, or a number of other plainly intrinsic
goods when it instead chose the often injuring and troublesome
thing-liberty-which the Court assumed promotes the modem
god of self actualization.
Odd though it seems, even to those who understand and
perhaps champion the claims of self-realization, it all comes back
to something clearly instrumental-even by their own admission
something "moral" and "better." Self-realization's legal chronicler
Murchison for one concluded that self-realizing speech "spurs a
greater awareness of the world" which "may spur action" possibly
"in the direction of justice," especially if each person's "moral
strength" "flourish[es]" for the "betterment of society. ' 58
Murchison cites the extensive writings of Charles Taylor on the
self, hoping that those writings may give new direction to legal
models of the self.59 Taylor claims self-fulfillment as a moral ideal
supplying content to the goal of justice. 60 And indeed there seems
a hint of sense and substance in what Taylor writes: that it is
inward articulations and outward expressions through which the
58. Murchison, supra note 5, at 461.
59. Id. at 462-63.
60. Id. at 462-63 (citing Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (1992);
Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language, Philosophical Papers I (1986);
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, the Making of Modem Identity (1989)).
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individual discovers meaning independent of the self and thus
transcends the self.
61
This conclusion is much like what was ventured above, that the
fact of cognitive expression (a baby's first word) seems to have
something of inherent value, but that further expression is
fundamentally instrumental toward the end of transcending that
very self. It is certainly not what the thorough-going self-seekers
conclude, that ultimate meaning remains in the expression of the
self absent and self-transcending. To put it another way, the
Lawrence Supreme Court conceptualized the self as transcending
authority in order for the self to reach its own autonomous
dimension. The Supreme Court's grand statements about speaking
being the ultimate good may or may not be an example of rootless,
new age philosophizing, in which the Court grants citizens the
liberty to decide for themselves what is right and wrong in
exchange for citizens accepting its ultimate authority-a sort of
"We will be your Court, and you will be our people" as one of its
critics Gerard Bradley has pointed out. 62 In contrast to the Court's
approach, Taylor sees the self transcending its natural constraints
in order to recognize independent moral authority-reflecting what
Murchison calls "a background of external goods." 63 Taylor in
that way tries to cure what he acknowledges to be our all-too-
prevalent, debased, and superficial experiments in self-
fulfillment---our "non-moral desire to do what one wants without
interference. '"64 When he writes of transcending the self, Taylor
may indeed be on to something because it was the one, Jesus, who
explicitly insisted on an annihilation of the self who had far and
away the most actuated, moral, and realized life. The greatest
victory one can have, the old saints would say, is victory over
one's self.
So far these musings are not unique. Post for one calls the
Court's definitional attempts in this First Amendment area
"failures of judicial craftsmanship of truly stunning proportions. '" 65
The results of those attempts are to some equally difficult to
stomach: sodomy (that activity which the Lawrence Court's
decision ultimately defended), fraudulent commercial speech (Bose
Corp.), and parodies of drunken incest intended to destroy
reputation (Falwell). An unconstrained liberty is lawlessness
61. Murchison, supra note 5, at 463.
62. Gerard V. Bradley, The New Constitutional Covenant, The World & I
374 (1994).
63. Murchison, supra note 5, at 463.
64. Id. (quoting Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 21 (1992)).
65. Post, supra note 9, at 1270.
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revealed-without convention, without reference, without
judgment-and the picture of it is not pretty. Some justices of the
Supreme Court have come to the point of recognizing that
characterizing tortious expression as an intrinsic good will lead,
and in fact has led, the Court to the miry bottom of a slippery
slope. After Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court in the tort
case The Florida Star v. B.J.F.66 concluded a series of First
Amendment cases in which it progressively limited tort law's
privacy protection against the public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts, again in favor of the supposed intrinsic good of such
public expression. In The Florida Star the Court determined that
the press has the right to violate state law prohibiting the public
disclosure of the name of a rape victim which had accidentally
been disclosed in a police report. The enormous personal harm
from such unnecessary public disclosures 67 and the absence of any
apparent value to the disclosure, together with the absence of any
delimiting rationale within the Court's misconception of the
intrinsic basis for public expression or, for that matter, any
statement of the basis for the tort law protection, led the dissenters
to indeed conclude, "Today, we hit the bottom of the slippery
slope." 68 Consider first, though, the very idea of balancing care
against liberty.
III. BALANCING LIBERTY AND CARE
The context in which the Supreme Court most clearly declared
liberty to be an intrinsic good-the tort cases Falwell and Bose
Corp.-is important. It is important because liberty was not pitted
against some arguably arbitrary or paternalistic state regulation,
but against care. What was at stake was a person's well-being, and
moreover, the manner in which one person ought to relate to
another with respect to the other's well-being. If the Court's
assertion that liberty is an intrinsic good had come merely in a case
involving direct state regulation of speech, it would have been
necessary to explore the purpose of that state regulation-to look,
66. 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
67. In The Florida Star, the personal harms included repeated rape threats,
necessity of police protection, need to obtain mental health counseling, and the
need to abandon a home. Id. at 528, 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
68. Id. at 553, 109 S. Ct. at 2619 (White, J., dissenting); see also
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 97 S. Ct. 1045 (1977);
Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979); Landmarks
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
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as it were, for grounds or justifications on both sides of the ledger
(the expression and regulation sides). But the Court's assertion of
liberty as an intrinsic good in a tort case, and indeed a case in
which the defendant Flynt's intent to harm had been proven,69
made it quite clear what the Court's transcendent liberty was
supplanting-the care we would ordinarily owe one another.
The consideration of free (false) speech usually has no place in
pure tort cases such as when doctors give substandard advice
injuring their patients.7 ° One would think that the only liability
concern in such cases is the reasonableness of the care so
exercised, or in other words what is the professional standard. But
it is not merely the constitutional free speech concerns which have
pitted liberty against care in tort cases. The blame for tort law's
running afoul of liberty should not only rest with the Supreme
Court. That liberty is an interest competing against care was
already accepted as a fundamental premise of tort law, independent
of anything the Supreme Court has recently required of us.71
Balancing tests are endemic to tort law.72 It is typically freedom
against which we have come to balance care in tort law. Tort law
commentator Heidi Li Feldman writes that in the law of
negligence, we must strike a "balance between safety and
freedom" which adequately represents those competing interests
and values.73 David McCarthy writes that in the consideration of
rights against risks, tort law balances personal security against
personal liberty.
74
But it is not only that a balance need be stricken. It is generally
conceived that there is a competition between care and liberty, in
which one must limit the other. Robert Post writes in the
Georgetown Law Journal that "privacy torts limit individual
liberty" so as to enforce social norms. 75 Gregory Keating in the
Southern California Law Review summarizes the "task of tort
69. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), for more
details than were provided in the Supreme Court's opinion.
70. Post, supra note 9, at 1271.
71. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 349-60 (1996) (personal security
takes priority over economic liberty interest).
72. Garvey, supra note 49, at 84.
73. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
Ethics and Tort Law, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1431, 1433, 1465 (2000).
74. David McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 Ethics 205, 212-
15 (1997).




accident law" as "to reconcile our competing interests in liberty
and security" in our daily business.7
6
Others see it as even more than a balancing or competition
between liberty and care. Some believe that tort law is actually
harmful to liberty. Thus Mark Geisfeld in the Georgetown Law
Journal perceives in his consideration of the coherence of tort law
that "[a]ny precautionary obligations tort law imposes ... would
also be detrimental to [the] liberty interests" we daily exercise. 77
And ultimately, as we have seen, some tort law commentators do
more than pit liberty against tort law's care. They suggest that
liberty is the author and foundation of care-that tort law has its
justification in liberty.78  Richard Wright suggests in a
philosophical collection of leading tort law writers that individual
freedom justifies tort law. That supposition must be quite the
opposite of what is true, that one's exercise of liberty depends
upon, and is thus justified by, the exercise of reasonable care
toward one another.
Is it appropriate though to balance a liberty interest against care
in tort cases? Garvey's analysis of the nature of freedom suggests
one fundamental problem with this pitting of liberty against care,
and of care against liberty. Garvey gave us a corollary to his thesis
that freedom is not a universal right: that even where freedom
does exist as a fundamental right, it should not be assumed that it is
a bilateral form of freedom (a freedom to either do or not do what
is under consideration). 79 Bilateral freedoms do exist. They even
have the benefit of an apparent even-handedness. The right for
instance to practice a certain traditional religion reasonably implies
a right to practice no recognized religion at all. But simply
because one has a right to do something does not imply a right to
do its opposite. The liberty of the North to prohibit slavery ought
not to imply a liberty of the South to allow it. Garvey rightly
76. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort
Law ofAccidents, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193, 197 (2000).
77. Mark Geisfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort
Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 585, 592 (2003).
78. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427, 439-39 (1993) (citing
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (1797)) (freedom is the "most
fundamental, and most important, moral and political value" because it places
"responsibility upon each person to plan and live a life that is 'good' for that
individual."). See also Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in The
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 159 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
(individual and equal freedom justifies tort law).
79. Garvey, supra note 49, at 18, 39.
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characterizes the original Constitution's nearly fatal compromise
on that issue as a "failure to pursue good and forbid evil.., at the
level of fundamental principles[] show[ing] a lack of character or a
weakness of will."' 80  That judgments concerning good and bad
must be made is a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the
neutrality of value that is at the center of liberalism. 8' But it is a
conclusion nonetheless necessary to put the houses of care and
liberty in order: Judgments as to good and bad must be made and
must as a result constrain liberty.
Robert Post sees other problems with judicial balancing of
liberty interests against anything. In his view, First Amendment
cases do not assign rights and interests. Rather they authorize
social practices in certain settings. 2 Indeed Post points to the 1988
case Pickering v. Board of Education83 and the 1995 case United
States v. National Treasury Employees,84 in which the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the metaphor that it was doing any
balancing of anything.85  Post further argues that balancing
necessarily implies a muddled compromise of substantial rights
and interests, when to the contrary what the courts hope to do is to
authorize internally logical and coherent social practices. 6 Post
writes that "judicial decisions can most helpfully be conceptualized
as drawing boundaries between distinct social practices" rather
than muddling through an unhealthy compromise of substantial
rights and interests." Finally, Post sees that balancing tests
wrongly encourage a weighing of interests rudely abstracted from
social settings which lend them their only particular meaning. Post
concludes that "we cannot ever write on a clean slate, as though
legal values and interests simply fell disembodied from a clear
sky," and that purporting to do so enables the courts to skirt the
pertinent social dimensions of the constitutional values.
88
The difficulty though is not merely with liberty being weighed
in the balance against care. It is that when one of those two
interests (liberty) is assigned an intrinsic value, the opposing
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Post, supra note 9, at 1279.
83. 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734-35 (1988).
84. 513 U.S. 454,465-66, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1995).
85. Post also cites Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of
Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 Hastings L.J. 711 (1994).
Post, supra note 9, at 1279 n.141.





interest (care) really has no chance of outweighing it. Intrinsic
goods have no instrumental equal. No balancing is really possible.
Here, again, is where we reach the Supreme Court's 1989 tort case
The Florida Star v. B.J.F., where this conceptual conundrum found
its own unfortunate expression. As briefly summarized above, in
that case the defendant newspaper unlawfully published a rape
victim's name which had mistakenly been included in a police
incident report. The publication resulted in death threats
purporting to be from the unidentified rapist, requiring the victim
to relocate and receive counseling for distress. In the dissenting
words of Justice White, the victim's interest was to protect herself
against what "[s]hort of homicide ... is the ultimate violation of
self.",89  The plaintiff had, in other words, a hugely substantial
interest, for the violation of which the jury had awarded $100,000.
But yet, The Florida Star majority found little to weigh in its favor
when reversing the verdict. It did not expressly rely on an
assumed inherent value in such speech, though a dissenting Justice
White saw in the majority's reasoning that very same absolutist
approach. Decrying the Court's increasingly absolutist position,
Justice White asked for at least some balancing: "The Court's
concern for a free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be
balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane society.
An absolutist view of the former leads to insensitivity as to the
latter."90
Balancing, though, is just the problem. Once one defines
liberty as the intrinsic good, and self-expression as the fundamental
value, there is little that care can do to combat the wrath of their
ghostly manifestation. Man has been unleashed from both his
creator and the created. There must be an alternative to balancing.
Law in general and tort law more particularly can not be founded
on liberty in the sense in which it has been conceived, or we will
continue to find ourselves at these ends, allowing unidentified
rapists to further harrow, and identified character assassins to
further distress, their victims.
IV. CARE AUTHORIZING LIBERTY
The universal ethic of care (or more prosaically love) for one
another has always been tort law's basis. The care ethic is the core
89. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2614
(1989) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, 97
S. Ct. 2861, 2869 (1977)).
90. Id. at 547 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 2616 n.2.
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of the world's major and many of its minor religions. 91 It is
unfortunate that we do not share the Greek lexical distinctions in
the forms of love, for it is of course the agape form, not eros, to
which is our reference. On so essential and misunderstood a
subject, our own English vocabulary is far too limited. It is the
former kind of love which is intrinsically good. To that conclusion
there may never have been a wise dissenter.
What though of the relationship of liberty to care? Could it be
the care that authorizes liberty? The Supreme Court has in its
more sensible moments concluded something like it. When Justice
Stewart concurred in the tort case Rosenblatt v. Baer stating that
"[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation" from
harm "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being,, 92 he stated something
like it. In case we missed the point, Justice Stewart immediately
echoed the refrain that the "concept [is] at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty."93 Justice Stewart thus neatly pointed
out that liberty, (or at least "ordered liberty") begins with the care
not to harm.
Justice Stewart's insight for a time became the dissenters'
refrain in a series of Supreme Court tort cases in which First
Amendment liberties advanced and care retreated. His dissent was
cited or quoted by the dissenters in Time, Inc. v. Hill9 4 in 1967,
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.95 in 1971, and Paul v. Davis96 and
Time, Inc. v. Firestone97 in 1976. Finally, a Court majority quoted
Justice Stewart's Rosenblatt dissent, when the First Amendment
tide slowed in 1985 in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.98 Interestingly though, when the Court in a more
recent tort case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.99 again quoted
91. See Mortimer D. Schwartz et al., Problems in Legal Ethics 17-19 (6th
ed. 2003) (citing H.T.D. Rost, The Golden Rule: A Universal Ethic 28, 39, 43,
49, 103, 114 (1986), and Benjamin Camfield, The Comprehensive Rule of
Righteousness, Do As You Would Be Done By 54-55 (1679)).
92. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 US 75, 92, 86 S. Ct. 669, 679 (1966) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. 385 U.S. 374, 414 n.5, 87 S. Ct. 534, 556 n.5 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
95. 403 U.S. 29, 78, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 1837 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 424 U.S. 693, 723, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1171 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
97. 424 U.S. 448, 471, 96 S. Ct. 958, 973 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. 472 U.S. 749, 757-58, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2944 (1985).
99. 497 U.S. 1, 22-23, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707-08 (1990).
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Justice Stewart's Rosenblatt dissent, it missed the essence of
Justice Stewart's point that care in some fundamental sense
authorizes liberty. For the Milkovich Court placed care on
"another side to the equation"l 00-explicitly using the traditional
balancing language. At least in Milkovich, Justice Stewart's
characterization of care as the fundamental organizing principle
had succeeded in outweighing liberty in the balance.
For illustration purposes we might ask whether there are other
intrinsic goods recognized and promoted by the law. Care may not
be our only candidate. Interestingly, answering his own quite
pertinent question "What are freedoms for?," Garvey suggests that
the law protects freedom of religion precisely because the exercise
of religion is a good unto itself (as well as an instrumental
good). l As Garvey's reviewer Foster paraphrased, "freedom of
religion is protected because religion is a good unto itself and
advances good ends; it needs no other justification."'' 0 2 For its
believers, religion is a good unto itself because God commands it,
meaning that the believer has a duty to comply that transcends
argument and needs no instrumental justification. That God is
glorified is wholly sufficient. Religion though is also an
instrumental good to the extent that its practice promotes life,
peace, health, truth, and well-being.
Some caution should be taken in accepting the conclusion that
there are other intrinsic goods besides care, the freedom of religion
among them. For plainly certain exercises or acts taken in the
name of religion have not been good-have not been promoting of
the general welfare. But then, so too have many legislative and
individual acts, which were taken in the name of good, and turned
out not at all to be so. If one distinguishes devotion to care from
the particular acts one may choose (perhaps unwisely) to represent
that devotion, then the problem is eliminated or at least diminished.
There is nothing wrong with care, ever. There is often something
wrong with the way in which we attempt to express it or with the
way in which we characterize it that has nothing to do with care
but rather with greed, hate, or other opposites. So too with
religion: If one distinguishes devotion to universal being from the
particular acts of devotion, then the devotion indeed appears to be
intrinsically good, notwithstanding that the particular devotional
manifestations a person or group might choose from time to time-
such as the sacrifice of a child or of the entire religious
100. Id at22, 110S. Ct. at2707.
101. Garvey, supra note 49, at 49.
102. Foster, supra note 49, at 86.
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community-would indeed not be good at all but instead
representative of a quite contrary condition.
Unfortunately, Garvey muddied the waters a bit on the good
start he gave the subject. As noted above, Garvey concluded that
freedom of speech is protected for the same reason that "it is
intrinsically rood because it promotes the pursuit of
knowledge."' Note here the immediate problem: Nothing can be
intrinsically good because of anything. If something is good
because it accomplishes some end such as the pursuit of
knowledge, then it is not an intrinsic, but rather, an instrumental
good. Indeed Garvey rightly acknowledges that some forms of
speech do not promote knowledge. And he recognizes that as a
consequence, "Advertising and other forms of commercial speech
can be regulated to prevent fraud and discrimination or to promote
public safety" 04 --presumably because fraud and public
endangerment have no value. Garvey also recognizes that we
protect freedom of speech "because it allows us to monitor
(through the press) the actions of elected officials and to criticize
them if we disagree with what they are doing to serve our
interests."'10 5 Thus, we ought to conclude that freedom of speech
has no intrinsic goodness but is instead good only to the extent that
it accomplishes other ends.
So what then is freedom's proper place relative to care? It is
indeed curious that these answers have become so hidden to us,
when they were once so plain. Garvey points out that liberalism's
autonomy justification is frankly inconsistent with fundamental
principles of widely-held beliefs. ° 6 The notion that we are in any
conclusive sense autonomous may well be wrong, certainly so if
one accepts any degree of divine calling, guidance, or purpose.'0
7
Moreover, the notion that the free exercise of one's autonomy will
lead to a greater good is also wrong if one accepts what many do
accept as the corrupt nature of unconstrained man. '  Of what,
then, does liberty consist? Liberty must in its essence be freedom
from something, or it cannot be liberty. Do all the balancing you
want: It is still not freedom from care which justifies liberty. Nor
is it freedom from want. Rather, it has long been held outside the
law that liberty consists of freedom from the absence of care-




106. Garvey, supra note 49, at 45-46.
107. Id. at 46.
108. Id. at 45.
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hidebound by liberalism would call freedom from sin. In essence,
translating the penitent's verse, Garvey writes (in a context
different from tort law) that freedom tells us what we can do and
responsibility what we cannot.1
0 9
There are two ways in which we use the word "freedom." We
must not confuse the two. In one respect, we say that we have the
freedom to choose. And indeed we do. Our will is something
innate to us. It is an essential and treasured aspect of our being. It
is this form of freedom which some celebrate. But we also have
the freedom to enjoy, or for that matter, to suffer consequences.
There should be nothing about law's concept of freedom that
would remove from us our inherent right to receive that which is
due-whether good or bad-from our actions. Freedom to choose
implies freedom to receive the consequences. We cannot (as the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence to some degree does) glorify the
freedom to choose, without also honoring the freedom to receive
the consequences. When the Supreme Court or anyone else
conceives of an arena where there is liberty to choose, but no
liberty to receive the consequences, it is creating something quite
unreasonable. It is creating a jail or prison, a vacuum in which
actions have no consequences. It steals from us not only the
enjoyable fruit of our labor but also something worth far more to
us: the discipline for and correction of our wrongs.
Notice how care limits liberty by context. Physicians for
instance are compelled by their duty of care to conform their
conduct quite meticulously to a community standard when
practicing on their patients-a standard determined not merely by
a community of physicians but, in some cases, by a community of
patients expressly as to what the physician must say or not say.
The physician's standard of care is not merely as to conduct but as
to expression. It is not merely as to what physicians might wish to
express but what their patients might wish to hear. The
"reasonable patient" standard dictates what information the
physician must convey in order to obtain a patient's informed
consent-that information which the reasonable patient would
want to hear regarding the risks and benefits of the anticipated
procedure. A physician is perfectly free to express the physician's
self within those parameters, and indeed, perfectly free to express
the physician's self outside of those parameters, then being equally
free to receive the patient's condemnation when the patient is
unreasonably injured.
109. Id. at 86.
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In that sense, tort law's rule of care is a law without limit,
creating a perfect liberty-the liberty to do that which reflects an
adequate level of care. You can drive your car within the speed
limit and other rules of care as far, and for as long, and in whatever
direction or path, you want. One has liberty to drive within the
speed limit, and it is a perfect liberty. One has no liberty to drive
in excess of that limit-or at best, an imperfect liberty fraught with
untoward consequence. Given his nature, man has often sought to
turn right or left from the way of care. Man has indeed always had
that kind of liberty. But it is a kind of liberty that has always
carried consequences including the consequence of reducing one's
liberty. Any other liberty, such as the Falwell liberty to
intentionally inflict emotional distress on another or the Bose Corp.
liberty to defraud through commercial speech, is not liberty at all.
It deprives us of the discipline and redemption we require when we
greedily, intentionally, or unreasonably injure. Liberty is found
only within the parameters of care. Liberty in the positive,
normative sense merely describes what is to the right of the line
between right and wrong. Liberty has no normative value without
that recognition. In fact it would have a negative normative value
for everything to the left of the line that causes harm to oneself or
to another.
Consider it one more time in this manner. The modem
libertine claims a liberty interest and right of self-determination as
intrinsic goods, when liberty and self-determination are instead for
us quite neutral facts. We possess liberty, at least to a substantial
degree. We are largely self-determined. Defining the self (self-
determination) is (like liberty) only a conditional or instrumental
good and, at that, a quite neutral fact of our condition. The
goodness all depends on what self-definition one adopts. Define
yourself as Dahmer did, and try to call that good. Self-
determination as a murderer, misogynist, or child abuser is
unreasonable. One can almost hear the libertine responding, okay,
here it comes: You are going to start telling me how to dress, how
to act, how to think, and other deprivations of my liberty. But the
libertine often mistakes as if they were threats to liberty, what are
instead simply good counsel or bad consequence. This writer is
quite prepared to listen to anyone's good counsel and indeed
actively and frequently seeks it out. None of it is depriving of
liberty. In fact it creates greater pleasure, as it diminishes the
inevitable bad consequences of bad choices. That my wife might
tell me not to wear a certain outfit to an important first meeting is
not a constraint on my liberty but an invitation to greater liberties
from the untoward consequences of following my own often-
misguided taste and conscience.
[Vol. 66
LAWLESSNESS REVEALED
Extremes like Dahmer are good teachers, but one need not
support the argument by extremes. The libertine wears a long
beard and Hawaiian shirt to the office as an emblem perhaps of the
greater value he places on liberty, but then promptly wears the
same long beard and Hawaiian shirt to a concert where everyone is
similarly attired. The Hawaiian shirt speaks rebel in one context
and conformist in another. Someone else wears a white shirt to the
same office and a sadly out of place polo shirt to the same concert.
Both individuals are following stylistic conventions associating
them with their chosen groups. Both are fully self-determined but
equally influenced by convention. Both may value those
conventions quite highly. Who is to say that the Hawaiian shirt
wearer values his opportunity to choose flowered attire any higher
than the white shirt wearer values his opportunity not to? It might
be quite the opposite that the white shirt wearer would not be
"caught dead" in the Hawaiian shirt, whereas the Hawaiian shirt
wearer would often wear a white shirt where the stakes (a job
interview for instance) were just a little higher.
Are there other objections? The libertine or economist might
say that some "value" liberty more than others value it, and that it
is the opportunity to choose what to value (that choice being
liberty itself) that is an intrinsic good. This assertion too is
nonsense, at least in the manner in which it is often presented. It
presumes a limit on value. It presumes that we each have only so
much coin with which to value things, when in truth valuing is
limitless for each of us. Or worse, the economist presumes that
only those who have real coin (money) are able to participate in the
valuing process. See for instance Judge Posner's essay on the
philosophical foundation of tort law, where he acknowledges at the
outset that in his conception of this valuing process, the poor
would not be able to "buy" anything at all-not even clean air to
breathe. He simply deigns to "prescind" from this "baseline
problem.""10
Let us not prescind from anything, but instead cure baseline
problems. Take the example of the epicurean who claims to
"value" food taste so highly that he spends his last dollar on a
sumptuous meal rather than tithing, caring for his family, or doing
the other sensible things which fulfill responsibilities. The
libertine and economist might claim that such is the nature of
choice and of liberty that the epicurean ought in an efficient market
to have that freedom to value food taste-that to the epicurean,
110. Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A
Philosophical Inquiry, in The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 99
(David G. Owen ed., 1995).
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sensuality is the balance. But who is to say that the one who tithes
and feeds his family rather than buying the lavish meal values food
taste any less? Indeed in truth he may value it much more than the
epicurean but believe only that the simple meal he will eat with his
family, knowing that his other obligations are met, will taste far
better than anything the epicurean could purchase. He who has
found in care that perfect law of liberty has valued and purchased
without limit. There is no limit to the coin of value. To. solve
Judge Posner's baseline problem, the poor man values his breath as
much as the rich man who would deny it to him. Indeed he who
would refuse to deny it to another may value it far more. To
conceive of the value we place on one another or on that activity in
which we engage as a limited market is a fundamental
misconception. What one discovers (which history itself has
taught us) is instead that these things have no limits.
Thus care is, or is an essential aspect of, that perfect law which
authorizes liberty. The one who follows that perfect law has
liberty indeed. Where there is good sense of care, there is also
perfect freedom. That which constrains is not the duty of care so
much as it is the commission of contrary, harmful acts. Constraint
and bondage come not from caring for one another or even from
caring for ourselves, but rather from failing to care. It is precisely
when we abandon care as the perfect law of liberty that we become
enslaved to the consequences of carelessness. The contrary myth
that care constrains liberty, or still worse, that liberty is set against
and constrains care, fundamentally misunderstands both the law of
care and the nature of liberty. But that is precisely where our tort
law has left us.
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